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ARGUMENT 
J. HARRINGTONS ' STATEMENT OF FACTS MISCHARACTERIZES TWO CRITICAL POINTS. 
Two of the "facts" cited by the Harringtons as "undisputed" are not facts at all, but 
legal arguments. The Harringtons' "Fact" No. 13 asserts that "[t]he February 18 Letter 
Agreement and the checks provided by Mrs. Peterson are the only written documents relating 
to an agreement of the parties in February 1993 for Peterson to advance additional monies." 
(Brief of Appellees at 7, f 13 (emphasis added).) Mrs. Peterson, of course, objects to the 
Harringtons' use of the term "relating." Whether the Peterson Trust Deed and the December 
1992 Agreement "relate" to the February 1993 Agreement is one of the main issues before 
the Court; the Harringtons cannot simply declare them unrelated as an "undisputed fact." 
Moreover, the February 18 letter cannot properly be called a "letter agreement" since it is not 
one—it is merely a unilateral statement by Mr. Harrington, prepared without either 
participation by or request from Mrs. Peterson. 
In the same vein, the Harringtons' "Fact" No. 15 declares that "[t]here was no 
promissory note reflecting the $69,626.84l loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter 
Agreement, nor is there any document reciting that the monies loaned pursuant to that letter 
agreement are secured by the [Peterson Trust Deed]." (Brief of Appellees at 7, f 15.) Once 
again, the Harringtons seem to expect the Court to accept as "facts" conclusions favorable 
to themselves on the very points at issue: whether a promissory note exists reflecting the 
1993 advances, and whether these advances are secured by the Peterson Trust Deed. The 
*The actual amount advanced was $70,076.44. (Record at 831, f 24.) 
1 
1993 advances, in addition, were not "loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement"; 
they were made pursuant to Mr. Harrington's February 1993 request. The February 18 letter 
was not the agreement—nor is it even an accurate memorialization of the oral 
agreement—under which the 1993 advances were made. 
Z7. THE 1993 ADVANCES WERE SECURED BY THE PURCHASE MONEY TRUST DEED. 
The Peterson Trust Deed explicitly secures four categories of later transactions: 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
hereof in the principal sum of $95,000, made by Trustor, payable to the order 
of Beneficiary at the time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, 
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof; 
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; 
(3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be 
made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and 
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or 
pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
(Record at 193.) The Harringtons argue mainly that clause 3 (above) governs the 1993 
advances, totaling $70,076.44, to which Mrs. Peterson agreed in February 1993; and that 
these advances were not evidenced by a promissory note reciting that they were secured by 
the original deed of trust, and were therefore not secured, they conclude, by the original deed 
of trust. The Harringtons are mistaken. 
A. The 1993 Advances Are Evidenced by a Promissory Note Secured by the June 1991 
Peterson Trust Deed. 
Whether clause 3 (above) does govern the 1993 advances is in reality a moot point: 
even assuming, arguendo, that it might, the later advances were quite clearly covered by a 
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completely satisfactory promissory note secured by the June 1991 Peterson Trust Deed. 
1. The Letter of February 1993 Constitutes a Promissory Note. 
The Harringtons declare that the "the February 18 Letter Agreement.2. . . contains no 
promise to pay by HPI or Harrington" (Brief of Appellees at 21-22). Actually, of course, 
Mr. Harrington's letter expressly assures Mrs. Peterson that "any money advanced by you 
. . . will be returned to you with interest. . . prior to the distribution of any proceeds to 
Harrington Properties, Inc." (Record at 454 (emphasis added).) A promise to pay does not 
become any less a promise by being cast into the passive voice, nor does the fact that this 
particular promissory note may be nonnegotiable for lack of sum certain and specific date 
render it any less enforceable. See DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises. 879 P.2d 1353,1357 (Utah 
1994) ("Because the payment of the note was subject to conditions, it is not a negotiable 
instrument. Rather, the note is simply a promise by the DeBrys to pay . . . upon the 
defendants' compliance with the conditions."); First Investment Co. v. Andersen. 621 P.2d 
683, 686 (Utah 1980) ("The mere promise to pay, absent the magic words 'payable to order 
or to bearer' renders the note nonnegotiable, and the liability is determined as a matter of 
simple contract law.") 
Mr. Harrington promised to pay "any money advanced" by Mrs. Peterson "above and 
2The word "agreement" inaccurately represents the purpose and nature of the February 
18, 1993, letter. It was in fact a purely unilateral declaration by Mr. Harrington. The letter 
itself is not an "agreement" somehow enforceable against Mrs. Peterson, as the Harringtons 
evidently believe it to be. Nor is it by any stretch of the imagination an integration of the 
agreement made in February of 1993 concerning Mrs. Peterson's advance of the sums 
necessary to complete Mr. Harrington's spec home. 
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beyond the $75,000.00" negotiated in the December 1992 Agreement. Mrs. Peterson, in the 
ensuing months after February 1993, advanced a total of $70,076.44 in new funds, for which 
Mr. Harrington is now liable under the February 18, 1993, promissory note.3 As explained 
below, this Note was secured—directly and indirectly—by the 1991 Peterson Trust Deed. 
2. Mr. Harrington's February Letter Memorializes a Modification to the 
December 1992 Agreement. 
Despite the Harringtons' contention that "[n]o such alteration, adjustment, or change 
ever occurred to the Peterson Note or [the Peterson Trust Deed]" (Brief of Appellees at 15), 
the 1993 advances were clearly made pursuant to a modification of the earlier December 
1992 Agreement (itself an "addition" to the original financing provided by Mrs. Peterson) 
extending the amount to be loaned thereunder "above and beyond the $75,000.00" originally 
contemplated thereby (Record at 454).4 Thus, the fact that the 1993 advances are secured by 
the Peterson Trust Deed is easily deduced from an examination of the various documents 
memorializing the several related agreements between the Harringtons and Mrs. Peterson. 
3The proceeds of sale of the Sunset Oaks Property were of course insufficient to cover 
the 1993 advances. At present, Mrs. Petersons's net loss, on this point only, of principal plus 
interest approaches $100,000.00. 
^ h e Harringtons may argue here that the December 8,1992, Agreement provides that 
it "may not be amended or modified except by an instrument in writing signed by each of the 
parties." (Record at 451, f 10.) It is, however, a well-recognized rule of law that "parties 
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make new terms notwithstanding terms in the 
contract designed to hamper such freedom." Prince v. R.C. Tolman Constr. Co.. 610 P.2d 
1267, 1269 (Utah 1980) (citing Davis v. Pavne and Day. Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 
(I960)): "notwithstanding recitals in a prior contract restricting changes or modification in 
its terms, the parties are as free in appropriate circumstances to renegotiate new terms or to 
make separate supplemental agreements as they were to make the contract in the first place." 
Id (citing Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963)). 
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The December 8, 1992, Agreement recites, inter alia, that Mr. Harrington executed 
a Trust Deed Note for $95,000.00 on June 21,1991, payable to Mrs. Peterson, secured by the 
Peterson Trust Deed; that "[additional funds are needed to complete the construction of the 
improvements on the Property"; and that "Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to 
be used for that purpose . . . ." (Record at 975, fflf A, D, & E.) The moneys advanced by 
Mrs. Peterson under the December 1992 Agreement, in other words, were in addition to the 
$95,000.00 she had previously provided in June of 1991 by agreeing to seller financing. 
Accordingly, the $75,000.00 advanced under the December 1992 Agreement were expressly 
"secured by [the] Trust Deed dated June 21,1991 . . . . " (Record at 977, f 8.)5 This language 
alone demonstrates that both parties considered the December 1992 commitment not merely 
a related transaction, but an extension or modification of the original $95,000.00 financing. 
In February of 1993, Mr. Harrington approached Mrs. Peterson for yet another 
"advance [of] additional monies to complete construction" (Record at 419, f 27), which Mr. 
Harrington has characterized as a "continuation of] her funding of the final construction that 
had started in December 1992." (Id.) The 1993 advances are merely an extension or 
modification of the December 1992 Agreement—an agreement which quite clearly recites 
that it is secured by the Peterson Trust Deed—and are therefore a further extension or 
5As a related future advance, the $75,000.00 would have been secured under one or 
more of clauses 1, 2, and 4 of the Peterson Trust Deed's dragnet provision. See infra at pp. 
14-20. Counsel for Mrs. Peterson, however, included this clarifying statement referring to 
the 1991 Trust Deed as "assurance double sure" and not, as the Harringtons would have it, 
as some sort of admission that only clause 3 governs future advances. Moreover, there is 
nothing in the law which forbids the securitization of a future advance, related or not, under 
an earlier agreement. 
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modification of the 1991 and 1992 Peterson Financings. The 1993 advances, then, are 
secured by the December 1992 Agreement, of which by extension they are a part, and which 
is itself an extension or modification of the 1991 Peterson Note. This clearly brings the later 
Peterson advances under clause 1 of the Trust Deed dragnet provision, which secures "any 
extensions and/or renewals or modifications" of the Peterson Note. 
B. The "Plain Language" of Clause 3 of the Trust Deed Excludes the 1993 Advances. 
A "dragnet" clause is a "provision in a mortgage in which a mortgagor gives security 
for past and future advances as well as present indebtedness." Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper 
Co., 907 P.2d 1179,1181 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 494 (6th 
ed. 1990)). In Mead Corp.. this Court upheld as a valid dragnet clause a contractual 
provision stating that the collateral involved secured "all Debtor's present and future debts, 
obligations and liabilities of whatever nature to Bank." 907 P.2d at 1182. The four clauses 
of the Peterson Deed's securitization provision (quoted at p. 2 above) likewise secure present 
and future advances. 
Under Utah law, however, as Mrs. Peterson has already pointed out (Appellants' Brief 
at 18), a dragnet clause "will not be extended to cover future advances unless the advances 
are of the same kind and quality or relate to the same transaction or series of transactions as 
the principal obligation secured or unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance 
refers to the [security agreement] as providing security therefor." Heath Tecna Corp. v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank. 609 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added) (citing First 
Security Bank v. Shiew. 609 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1980)); accord Bank of Kansas v. Nelson 
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Music Company. Inc.. 949 F.2d 321, 324 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Ram Co. v. Estate of 
Kobbeman. 696 P.2d 936,942 (Kan. 1985)) (Summarizing the factors "motivating} Kansas' 
policy disfavoring dragnet clauses," including "application of the dragnet clause to unrelated, 
dissimilar, and often distant obligations "); First Nat'l Bankr Cortez. Colorado v. First 
Interstate Bank. Riverton. Wyoming, 774 P.2d 645, 655 (Wyoming 1989); Nat'l Bank of 
Waterloo v. Moeller. 434 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Iowa 1989). 
Utah case law, in other words, provides two paths by which future advances may be 
secured under a dragnet clause: first, the future advances may be "of the same kind and 
quality or relate to the same transaction or series of transactions" as did the original 
obligation, or second, documentation of the subsequent advance may refer to the original 
obligation as security. Thus, for a future advance to be covered by a dragnet clause—like 
clauses 1 through 4 of the securitization provision in the trust deed at issue in the present 
dispute—the future advance must be related to the original transaction, or, if unrelated, there 
must be a writing referencing the original as security therefor. 
The Harringtons attack this position by arguing that First Security Bank v. Shiew. 609 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1980) (upon which, among other cases, Mrs. Peterson relied in her opening 
brief), "in no way suggests that if a loan is related to a prior loan, it is secured despite 
specific language in the trust deed to the contrary." (Brief of Appellees at 13.) No "specific 
language . . . to the contrary," however, appears anywhere in the trust deed. Clause 3 
provides only that it secures "additional loans or advances . . . when evidenced by a 
promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust" (Record at 
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193)—it says nothing at all about relatedness or unrelatedness. But since the case law reads 
into all dragnet clauses a provision securing any related future advance (i.e., related future 
advances would be considered secured by any general dragnet clause by operation of law 
regardless of whether a later writing referencing the original agreement existed or not), the 
only transactions upon which clause 3 can have any effect are unrelated future advances, for 
which such an express reference back would be necessary in order to secure them under the 
original agreement. 
The logic is inescapable: clause 3 can govern only unrelated future transactions. To 
related future advances, it is irrelevant: Utah case law imposes security whenever a general 
dragnet clause is followed by a later related advance of funds. The application of Utah case 
law, and the resulting inference that clause 3fs written reference requirement applies only to 
unrelated future advances, contrary to the Harringtons' argument, is not an impermissible 
amendment of clause 3 {see Brief of Appellees at 12); it is merely the obvious conclusion to 
be drawn from a set of ironclad premises. 
C. The 1993 Advances Are Related Future Advances, and Are Therefore Secured by 
the Peterson Trust Deed. 
The multipart dragnet clause in the Peterson Trust Deed can thus be seen to cover 
present and future advances, both those related to the original transaction—the purchase of 
the Sunset Oaks property for the purpose of building a house for resale—under the provisions 
of clauses 1, 2, and 4, as well as other later advances unrelated thereto, if in conformance 
with clause 3's writing requirement. 
The Harringtons, however, next argue that the $70,076.44 1993 advances were 
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completely unrelated to the original transaction secured by the Peterson Trust Deed, and that 
clause 3 must therefore govern the advance anyway, even if, as Mrs. Peterson has shown, 
clause 3 covers only unrelated future advances. "Even if defendants' argument were 
correct," the Harringtons contend, "the 1993 advances relate to the construction loan 
(Guardian State Bank) and not to the Peterson Note for the purchase of the undeveloped lot" 
(Brief of Appellees at 12 n.7). This argument is an unwarranted (and unconvincing) isolation 
of the 1993 advances from the earlier financings with which they were bound up. 
That the 1993 advances were related to the original $95,000.00 financing can be easily 
demonstrated by the application of either of the two tests which have evolved for determining 
the intent of the parties to agreements containing dragnet clauses. Under the "relationship 
of the loans" standard, "if there be little or no connection between the loans or the loans be 
so different in nature, an inference can be drawn that the parties did not intend the second 
loan to fall under the security of the first loan." Shiew. 609 P.2d at 957 (citing Union Bank 
v. Wendland. 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). The "reliance on the security" 
test, on the other hand, focuses its inquiry on "whether the second loan was made in reliance 
on the original security." Id 
L The Relationship of the Loans Test 
In Mead. 907 P.2d 1179, West One Bank extended two kinds of financing on the same 
day to a company referred to as Graphics. One was a $50,000.00 revolving credit line. The 
other was a $100,000.00 loan. Both were secured by a $100,000 letter of credit from Wells 
Fargo. The credit line was also secured by Graphics' accounts receivable and inventory. The 
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security agreement executed in connection with the line of credit contained a dragnet clause, 
stating that the collateral "secure[d] all of Debtor's present and future debts, obligations and 
liabilities of whatever nature to the bank . . . including loans made pursuant to this 
Agreement and the Debtor's obligations hereunder." Graphics later sought additional 
financing from the Mead Corporation, which extended credit to Graphics also secured by 
Graphics' inventory and accounts receivable. 
Graphics defaulted, and West One drew on the Wells Fargo letter of credit. A Mr. 
Johnson, who was related to a principal of Graphics, reimbursed Wells Fargo and West One 
assigned its interest in the $50,000 credit line note and security agreement to Johnson. Mead 
filed suit to determine the parties' priority in regard to the inventory and accounts receivable. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Johnson, ruling that he had first priority. On 
appeal, Mead argued that the dragnet clause was limited to the $50,000 credit line, and was 
not intended to apply to the $ 100,000 note—that is, that the inventory and accounts could not 
be considered collateral for the $100,000 loan—and that Johnson was not entitled to 
subrogation as to the collateral. 
This Court disagreed with Mead's first argument, pointing to the language of the 
various agreements, and adding that "[t]he fact that both transactions were completed on the 
same day by the same parties strongly suggests they were related transactions." 907 P.2d at 
1182. The Court therefore held that the dragnet clause had validly bestowed upon West One 
an interest in the collateral which secured the $100,000 loan—including Graphics' inventory 
and accounts—but reversed the trial court on the ground that Johnson was not entitled to 
10 
equitable subrogation because of the unique character of letters of credit. 
The relatedness issue in the present dispute recalls that which was presented in Mead. 
From 1980 until 1991, Mr. Harrington built six homes for resale in Summit and Salt Lake 
Counties. (Record at 409, f 3.) Hearing of the Sunset Oaks property, Mr. Harrington 
contacted Mrs. Peterson and, in his own words, "expressed interest in purchasing the . . . 
property from her for the purpose of building a home on the property for resale." (Id, ffl[ 4 
& 5.) Harrington's goal was the construction of the house on the Sunset Oaks lot; purchasing 
the Peterson property was simply a means to that end. Harrington did not purchase the land 
as a nature preserve and then later on formulate a plan to build a house there; he entered the 
transaction with the express intent to construct and sell a house. He specifically negotiated 
the subordination of the Peterson Trust Deed to the Guardian State Bank construction loan, 
both of which were concluded as part of the same closing on June 21,1991. Since those two 
were clearly tied to the same purpose, it follows that the later construction financing from 
Mrs. Peterson also related to the same objective as the 1991 financing. 
Under the "relationship of the loans" standard, "if there be little or no connection 
between the loans or the loans be so different in nature, an inference can be drawn that the 
parties did not intend the second loan to fall under the security of the first loan." Shiew. 609 
P.2d at 957 (citing Union Bank v. Wendland, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). 
Here, however, far from being able to show "little or no connection" between the 1991 
financing and the '92 and '93 advances, one is hard-pressed to distinguish the ultimate 
purpose of one from the others. Mr. Harrington's stated purpose in entering into the 1991 
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agreement was to "purchas[e] the Sunset Oaks Property . . . for the purpose of building a 
home on the Property for resale." (Record at 409, f 5.) His request for "additional monies" 
from Mrs. Peterson in February 1993 was "for the purpose of construction of the home 
located at 1656 S. Sunset Oaks Dr[ive]." (Record at 454.) The purpose of the three 
financings was identical; one cannot seriously argue that they are disparate, unrelated 
transactions. 
2. The Reliance on the Security Test 
The focus of the "reliance on the security" test is "whether the second loan was made 
in reliance on the original security when a different security is taken for the second loan 
an intent cannot be inferred that parties relied on the security for the first loan." Shiew. 609 
P.2d at 957 (citing Wendland. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 557); see also Pearll v. Williams. 704 P.2d 
1348,1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Applying the reliance on the security test, the Pearll court 
concluded that the future advance there at issue was secured by an earlier mortgage on the 
grounds, among others, that "nothing in the . . . promissory note . . . indicates that different 
security would be used or . . . . that the second note would be unsecured." 704 P.2d at 1352. 
Similarly, in the present dispute, Mr. Harrington's unilateral February 18,1993, letter 
recites no other security, and twice references the December 8, 1992, Agreement—the terms 
of which Mrs. Peterson believed Mr. Harrington had agreed would govern the 1993 
advances, as she stated in her supplemental affidavit: 
When, in February of 1993, I agreed at the request of Mr. Harrington to 
advance certain additional funds, I did not ask Mr. Harrington to memorialize 
our understanding with any letter. His letter of February 18, 1993 was 
prepared and sent by him unilaterally. That letter does not completely describe 
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what we then agreed to. The new advances contemplated pursuant to my 
February 1993 discussions with Mr. Harrington were to be made under all of 
the same terms as set forth in the December 8, 1992 Agreement. I recall that 
Mr. Harrington and I verbally agreed that such advances were to be treated 
exactly the same as the prior advances made under the December 8, 1992 
Agreement. If I had been made aware or otherwise believed that those new 
1993 advances would not be secured by the Sunset Oaks property, I would not 
have agreed to make those new advances, nor would I have made them. When 
I received the February 18,1993 letter, I only quickly looked at it, and did not 
respond to it, believing that the new advances would be treated the same as 
under the December 8, 1992 written Agreement. 
(Record at 830-31, f 23.) Mrs. Peterson relied expressly upon these oral assurances by Mr. 
Harrington when she agreed in February 1993 to make more advances. 
The Harringtons' respond that "there is no mention of any such agreement or 
understanding" in Mr. Harrington's unilateral letter of February 18,1993 (Brief of Appellees 
at 19). This proves nothing, however, since the letter did not affirmatively state that the new 
advances would be governed in any way materially different from the terms of the December 
1992 Agreement. In any event, unilateral recitations hardly constitute binding negotiated 
contracts. See, e.g., Fubar. Inc. v. Turner. 944 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Texas Ct. App. 1997) ("A 
unilateral declaration in a letter does not alter the binding terms of the original contract"). 
Citing the statute of frauds, the Harringtons also argue that "oral agreements may not 
be used to enforce monetary obligations against real property." (Brief of Appellees at 19.) 
"It is well settled," intones the Harrington Brief, "that the statute of frauds requires that 'an 
agreement to secure an obligation with real property' must be in writing." (Id at 20 (quoting 
Hector. Inc. v. United States Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987).) It is, 
however, equally well settled thatff [w]hen an oral contract otherwise prohibited by the statute 
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of frauds [including a transaction for the sale of realty] becomes enforceable because of part 
performance or otherwise, 'the Statute does not prevent enforcement of the remaining 
promises."' Holt v. Katsanevas. 854 P.2d 575, 580 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 147(2) (1979)). Here, Mrs. Peterson advanced $70,076.44 to the 
Harringtons based on Mr. Harrington's assurances that the additional funds advanced would 
be governed by the December 1992 Agreement; indeed, had she believed that the 1993 
advance was not to be secured by the Sunset Oaks property, "[she] would not have agreed 
to make those new advances " (Record at 831, f 23.) Mrs. Peterson has fully performed 
her obligations under this agreement; the Harringtons may not now seek spurious shelter 
behind the statute of frauds after coaxing more than $70,000.00 out of Mrs. Peterson through 
verbal assurances consistent with earlier written undertakings. 
D. The 1993 Advances were Secured Under Clauses 1, 2, and 4 of the Peterson Trust 
Deed's Dragnet Provision. 
The Harringtons adduce two arguments in support of their conclusion that "Clauses 
(1), (2), and (4) of the [Peterson Trust Deed] do not apply to the 1993 advances made by Mrs. 
Peterson. First," assert the Harringtons, "applying any of those clauses necessarily reads 
clause (3) out of the agreement. Second, by their own terms, clauses (1), (2) and (4) have no 
application here." (Brief of Appellees at 14.) 
/. Application of Clause 1, 2, or 4 has no effect on Clause 3. 
The Harringtons' argument that application of clause 1, 2, or 4 negates clause 3 is 
based entirely on the acceptance of their question-begging premise that application of these 
clauses "conflicts with clause (3)'s specific and express applicability to 'additional loans or 
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advances hereafter made.'" (Brief of Appellees at 14.) The Harringtons, in other words, ask 
the Court to assume that clause 3 governs the 1993 advances as part of their argument to 
prove that only Clause 3 governs the 1993 advances (rather than clause 1, 2, or 4). 
Clauses 1,2, and 4, however, are not fatally inimical to clause 3. Clause 1 secures 
future advances made pursuant to a modification of the original loan; clause 2 secures future 
advances made pursuant to performance of the agreements in the Trust Deed (subsidizing 
repair work, for example); and clause 4 secures future advances "expended or advanced by 
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof " (such as paying construction workers 
so as to avoid mechanics' liens, to protect the security (see ^ f 7)). None of these would in any 
way negate or void clause 3; indeed, quite the reverse: under Harringtons' argument, clause 
3 nearly eviscerates clauses 1, 2, and 4. A future advance pursuant to a clause 1 
modification, clause 2 performance, or a clause 4 expenditure could not be secured under the 
Harrington premise because any such advance would be "subsequent and additional to the 
original loan" (Brief of Appellees at 14), and thus subject to clause 3 alone. 
Such a reading, however, cannot be correct. As the Harringtons themselves point out, 
"A contract, such as a trust deed, must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all 
its provisions." (Brief of Appellees at 14 (citing Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665 
(Utah 1992) and Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1992).) Plainly, as 
Mrs. Peterson has already pointed out, of the universe of possible transactions, the only sort 
which necessitates clause 3 (i.e., which is not covered by clause 1, 2, or 4) is the unrelated 
future advance; the other three clauses cover everything else. 
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2. Clauses 1, 2, and 4, by Their Express Terms, are Each Sufficient to Secure 
the 1993 Advances. 
a. The 1993 Advances are a Modification of the Original Loan, Secured 
by Clause 1. 
Clause 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed expressly secures "any extension and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof." The Harringtons, however, assert that "[n]o . . . alteration, 
adjustment, or change ever occurred to the Peterson Note or [the Peterson Trust Deed]." 
(Brief of Appellees at 15.) This, however, is clearly not true. As Mrs. Peterson has already 
explained (see supra at p. 5-6), the $70,000.00+ loaned to Mr. Harrington after February 
1993 was advanced pursuant to an extension and modification of the agreement made in 
December 1992. That Agreement recites the fact that Mr. Harrington executed a Trust Deed 
Note for $95,000.00, payable to Mrs. Peterson, on June 21, 1991, secured by the Peterson 
Trust Deed; that "[ajdditional funds are needed to complete the construction of the 
improvements on the Property"; and that "Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to 
be used for that purpose . . . ." (Record at 975, | f A, D, & E.) The moneys advanced by 
Mrs. Peterson under the December 1992 Agreement were thus in addition to the $95,000.00 
financing she had already provided in June of 1991. This addition constitutes the extension 
and/or modification the existence of which the Harringtons deny. 
The $75,000.00 advanced under the December 1992 Agreement were expressly 
"secured by [the] Trust Deed dated June 21, 1991 " (Record at 977, f 8.) In February 
1993, Mr. Harrington again sought a modification, asking Mrs. Peterson for another 
"advance [of] additional monies to complete construction" (Record at 419, f 27)—a 
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"continuation of] her funding of the final construction that had started in December 1992." 
(Id.) The 1993 advance is thus properly seen as an extension or modification of the 1992 
agreement secured by the Peterson Trust Deed. 
b. The 1993 Advances Were in Connection With Performance of an 
Agreement in the Trust Deed, and Were Thus Secured by Clause 2. 
Clause 2 of the Peterson Trust Deed's dragnet provision secures "the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained." Among the various agreements in connection 
with the property enumerated in the Peterson Trust Deed is a promise "to complete . . . 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed.. 
. thereon." (Record at 430, f 1.) 
Mr. Harrington purchased the Sunset Oaks Property to construct a house for resale, 
an activity plainly within the scope of the quoted language, and one for which Mrs. Peterson 
thrice provided funding. The Harringtons' brief shies away from its earlier arguments in 
favor of "plain language" on this point, however, instead spending two pages (pp. 15-17) 
arguing that paragraph 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed does not mean what it says. 
The Harringtons argue that paragraph 1 applies only to construction loans because (a) 
"[t]he purpose of the provision is . . . To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust,'" which, 
they declare, "was [not] given . . . to secure a construction loan" (Brief of Appellees at 16), 
and (b) later language in paragraph 1 refers to construction loans (id at 16-17). 
The Harringtons claim "that the [Peterson Trust Deed] was given to secure a purchase 
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of raw land and not to secure a construction loan 6 . . . . Plaintiffs therefore could have no 
obligation under the trust deed to maintain a structure or complete construction on a structure 
that did not exist at the time of purchase." (Brief of Appellees at 16.) The Harringtons' 
syllogism, however, breaks down in light of paragraph 1 of the Peterson Trust Deed, which 
required Mr. Harrington to "complete... any building which maybe constructed" (emphasis 
added), not "which has already been built or begun." Nor is there any clause nullifying the 
requirement if the security consists of a vacant lot; in fact, the reverse would actually be the 
case, for a lot with a half-finished building on it might very easily decrease in value, thus 
tarnishing the security of the loan. This language has nothing to do with the state of the land 
when purchased, but with protecting the value of the land thereafter. 
The Harringtons' argument that later language in paragraph 1, concerning construction 
loans, somehow controls the earlier requirement (discussed above) is similarly flawed. Quite 
aside from the fact the earlier requirement, by its own terms, applies whether or not a 
building presently sits upon the property, the provision on construction loans at the end of 
paragraph 1 is clearly separate from the earlier clause: 
if the loan secured hereby . . . is being obtained for the purpose of financing 
construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with 
reasonable diligence to completion . . . , and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during 
construction. 
6This, of course, is totally untrue: Mrs. Peterson disputes the Harringtons' repeated 
assertions that there was no connection between her $95,000.00 seller financing and the 
construction of the house on the Sunset Oaks Property (See §§ I, II.A.2, and III.A.2.a & b, 
supra). 
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(Record at 430,1f 1 (emphasis added).) It must be noted that the provision specifies that 
these agreements are "further" than the agreements previously enumerated in the paragraph. 
The construction loan contemplated here is idependent of with the earlier provision 
enjoining "completion]... [of] any building which may be constructed." Mrs. Peterson's 
1993 advances, therefore, made expressly "for the purpose of construction of the home 
located at 1656 S. Sunset Oaks Dr[ive]" (Record at 454) —that is, for "the performance of 
[an] agreement of Trustor contained" in the Peterson Trust Deed—are expressly covered by 
Clause 2 of the Trust Deed's dragnet provision. 
c. Clause 4 of the Dragnet Provision Secures the 1993 Advances. 
Clause 4 of the Peterson Trust Deed dragnet provision secures "the payment of all 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof. . . ." 
(Record at 430, f 1.) Paragraph 7 of the Peterson Trust Deed provides that "[s]hould Trustor 
fai l . . . to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary . . . may: Make or do the same in 
such manner to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. . . 
•" ( l i , t ?•) Admittedly unable to complete the construction of the house as required by his 
agreement in paragraph 1 to "complete . . . promptly and in good and workmanlike manner 
any building which may be constructed . . . thereon," Mr. Harrington approached Mrs. 
Peterson for further funding in December 1992 and in February 1993. Mrs. Peterson agreed, 
at his behest, to provide further advances to the extent necessary to complete the house on 
the Sunset Oaks Property. (Record at 831, f 24.) The 1993 advances were thus "sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms" of paragraph 7, and 
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were therefore fully secured by clause 4 of the dragnet clause of the Peterson Trust Deed. 
E. The 1993 Financing is Secured by the 1991 Trust Deed Simply by Virtue of Being 
an Extension of the 1992 Agreement 
While it is thus demonstrable that clauses 1,2, and 4 of the 1991 Trust Deed's dragnet 
provision plainly secure the 1993 advances, it is nevertheless obvious that the 1993 advances 
are secured under the 1991 Trust Deed independently. Inasmuch as the 1993 advances were 
made pursuant to an extension and modification of the December 1992 Agreement, which 
explicitly recites that it is secured by the 1991 Trust Deed (Record at 977, f 8), Mrs. 
Peterson's 1993 advances are likewise secured by the 1991 Trust Deed. 
III. INTEREST ACCRUING ON THE PETERSON NOTE AFTER IT FIRST CAME DUE IN MARCH 
OF 1992 WAS NOT LATER WAIVED. 
A. Interest Is Not Voided by Integration or Merger. 
The Harringtons argue that the "two specific entries [of N/A] on the Peterson note 
demonstrate that the parties specifically agreed that interest would not be applicable to the 
$95,000 dollar principal balance in the Peterson Note," (Brief of Appellees at 27.) Once 
again, the Harringtons seek to bind Mrs. Peterson to actions unilaterally performed by Mr. 
Harrington: in this case, his unilateral insertion of "N/A" into the blanks providing for 
interest on the form note, which Mrs. Peterson protested the moment she learned of it 
(Record at 172, f 12),7 since both Mr. Harrington's written offer and the earnest money 
7The Harringtons' brief, quoting Mrs. Peterson's brief out of context, asserts that 
"Defendants do 'not now claim[ ] interest for the time before the Peterson Note came due in 
March 1992," disingenuously insinuating that Mrs. Peterson has changed her position on this 
point. (Brief of Appellees at 28.) Indeed, in a footnote to this assertion, Harringtons declare 
that "Defendants necessarily recognize that the 'N/A' interest term is clear, unambiguous, 
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agreement provided for accrual of interest at 10% per annum (Record at 188 & 189). 
Seeking to divert attention from this fact, the Harringtons rather obliquely invoke the 
doctrines of parol evidence and merger: 
the Peterson Note was the "final expression" of the parties' agreement on the 
trust deed note, especially as to the "N/A" interest term. The Peterson Note 
was executed simultaneously with the Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust, 
which merged or integrated any prior contracts for conveyance. 
(Brief of Appellees at 28 n.15.) Actually, however, there is no integration clause anywhere 
in the Peterson Trust Deed, the Peterson Note, or the Warranty Deed; and in any case, "all 
relevant evidence is admissible on the threshold issue of whether [a] writing was adopted by 
the parties as an integration of their agreement.... even if the writing clearly states it to be 
a complete and final statement of the parties1 agreement." Union Bank v. Swenson, 
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
The Harringtons' merger argument is equally flawed. The merger doctrine applies 
only to matters "related directly to title." Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 
and not susceptible to any attack." (Id. at 28 n. 15.) Actually, Mrs. Peterson's brief states that 
she "questioned the CN/A' over of [sic] the phone from the moment a copy of the Peterson 
Note was faxed to her. Since she did not adequately follow that up, she has not now claimed 
interest for the time before the Peterson Note came due in March 1992." (Appellants' Brief 
at 14.) Mrs. Peterson has not changed her position and reiterates that she does not concede 
that Mr. Harrington's unilaterally slipping "n/a" into the blanks dealing with interest on the 
form note while she was in Florida renders the "n/a" unassailable. Rather, she contends that 
Mr. Harrington acted in bad faith; that the "n/a" is a spurious alteration of the March 1991 
agreement; and that the only reason she did not seek the interest which accrued prior to 
March 1992 was her assumption that the signed agreement was binding, no matter what 
circumstances precipitated its execution. By the time she was made aware that such was not 
the case, she had delayed overlong in bringing the claim. This procedural acknowledgment, 
however, is hardly makes Mr. Harrington's furtive insertion of "n/a" sacrosanct. 
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1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Secor v. Knight. 716 R2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986)); accord 
Hunt v. Kojac. 666 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("Excepted from th[e merger] 
rule are provisions which involve a . . . 'collateral undertaking' that is not connected with 
title, possession or quantity of land."). Interest rates—especially post-default interest 
rates—are too far removed from issues of transfer of ownership, encumbrance, quiet 
enjoyment, type of estate, amount of land involved, or any other matter "related directly to 
title," to be covered by the merger doctrine. 
B. Interest at 10% Upon the Harrington's March 21, 1992, Default, Nine Months 
After Execution of the Peterson Trust Deed, and Nine Months Prior to the 
Execution of the December 1992 Agreement, was not Later Excused or Waived 
The allotted time for repayment of the $95,000.00 principal under the Peterson Trust 
Deed ran on March 21,1992, nine months from the execution of the Trust Deed, as provided 
therein. (See Record at 428.) As part of the December 1992 Agreement, Mrs. Peterson gave 
the Harringtons extra time, until the date the Sunset Oaks property was sold, to repay the 
original $95,000.00 principal ("the sum owed by Harrington under the terms of the original 
Trust Deed Note" (Record at 450, f 4)), as well as the advances for which the December 
1992 Agreement provided. The Harringtons apparently believe that Mrs. Peterson's leniency 
toward them as to the date of payment somehow deprives her of the right to claim the interest 
on a debt already nine months in arrears. (Brief of Appellees at 30.) 
The Harringtons assert that the "first sentence of paragraph 4 [of the December 1992 
Agreement] . . . . clearly and unambiguously extends the 'due date' for the Peterson Note to 
the date of closing . . ." (Brief of Appellees at 30), and thus that "interest on that note was 
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'not applicable' until the due date of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property, i.e., February 24, 
1994" (id). They declare moreover, incorrectly, that "the December 8 Agreement... omits 
any reference to interest on the $95,000.00 Peterson Note." (Id) 
The Harringtons forget that the Peterson Note clearly and unambiguously provides for 
accrual of interest, and that Mr. Harrington inscribed no "N/A" in the blanks provided in the 
paragraphs dealing with post-default interest, thereby acquiescing to its accrual. Interest thus 
began to accrue at the statutory rate of 10% per annum from the Harringtons' default in 
March of 1992.8 
That paragraph 4 of the December 1992 Agreement, unlike paragraph 3, makes no 
mention of the interest accruing on the $95,000.00, only means that this still-accruing interest 
is not subject to the same restrictions on repayment as the other items addressed there. 
Interest had been accruing on the $95,000.00 financing for nine months already. That 
mention of the interest on the earlier sum was not made in one section of the December 1992 
Agreement, far from proving none was intended, as Harringtons contend (Brief of Appellees 
at 30), actually proves that no modification was either intended or made to the provisions of 
the Peterson Note mandating the accrual of interest upon default. Interest thus continued to 
run until the present. Mrs. Peterson's agreement to collect the principal of the $95,000.00 
financing only from the property or its sale proceeds did not in any way alter the accrual of 
interest thereon, nor the sources from which it may be collected. 
Accrued interest on the $95,000.00 financing is now close to $60,000.00. 
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IV. MRS. PETERSON SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEYS9 FEES. 
Mrs. Peterson is entitled to her attorneys' fees under paragraph 19 of the Peterson 
Trust Deed: "[u]pon . . . any default... Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover . . . all costs 
and expenses . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee" (Record at 966); and paragraph 6 of 
the December 1992 Agreement: "Peterson shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred by 
her in enforcing the terms hereof, including reasonable attorney fees " (Record at 977.) 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Mr. Harrington thrice approached Mrs. Peterson for financing and 
additional loans, totaling in principal alone nearly a quarter of a million dollars 
($239,626.84). It is undisputed that Mrs. Peterson advanced these sums, and that Mr. 
Harrington received and spent them. Mrs. Peterson, responding in good faith to Mr. 
Harrington's importunate wheedling—backed by Harrington's promises, loaned him this 
sizable amount expecting timely and proper repayment with interest. Mr. Harrington, 
however, while coaxing this small fortune out of Mrs. Peterson, without Mrs. Peterson's 
knowledge, raised the amount of the construction loan to which Mrs. Peterson had agreed 
temporarily to subordinate her own claim, declared bankruptcy without including Mrs. 
Peterson on the list of creditors (indeed, only reluctantly acknowledging it several months 
later), and then sought to transform his obligation to repay the 1993 advances to one that is 
unsecured and to have her money free and clear of any interest payment whatsoever. 
Mrs. Peterson seeks only to recoup the monies and interest still owing to her—an 
amount approaching $160,000.00—and the law as set forth herein and in Mrs. Peterson's 
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main brief amply supports the proper result, under both law and equity, that Mrs. Peterson 
should recover what is rightfully hers. 
Despite the apparent complexity of the arguments set forth in the briefs, Mrs. 
Peterson's position is actually quite straightforward. She seeks the Court's determination of 
two purely legal issues: whether the 1993 advances were, as she maintains, secured by the 
1991 Peterson Trust Deed, and whether interest at the statutorily mandated 10% began to 
accrue on the Peterson Note from March of 1992 onward. These issues can be resolved by 
this Court as questions of law. The Harringtons' position, on the other hand, requires the 
Court to determine whether Mr. Harrington's unilateral February 18,1993, letter constitutes 
an integration of the agreement between the parties, whether they intended interest to run 
from the time of default, and whether the parties intended future advances to be secured 
under the 1991 Trust Deed. All of these questions focus on facts which are quite obviously 
in dispute (and which preclude summary judgment in favor of the Harringtons). 
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reverse the decision 
below, granting summary judgment to Defendants, or alternatively to vacate the decision 
below, and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this day of April, 1998. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Harold C.Vertlaaren 
John K. Mangum 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
25 
CERTIFICA TE OF SER VICE 
On the ffik day of April, 1998, two copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' 
REPLY BRIEF were mailed, first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to 
James S. Jardine 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
